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Communities of complicity:
Notes on state formation and local sociality in rural China
A B S T R A C T
In this article, I deal with the tension in rural China
between vernacular practice in local sociality and
official representations related to processes of state
formation and with the ways in which this tension is
revealed and concealed through gestures of
embarrassment, irony, and cynicism. Such gestures
point toward a space of intimate self-knowledge
that I call a “community of complicity,” a concept
derived from Michael Herzfeld’s outline of “cultural
intimacy.” I illustrate how such communities are
constituted with examples involving Chinese
geomancy (fengshui), funerary rituals, and
corruption. I contrast this approach with arguments
made about “state involution” in China. [rural China,
state formation, state involution, cultural intimacy,
fengshui, corruption]
People do not fight for abstract perfection but for the intimacies that lie
behind it.
—Michael Herzfeld
T
he inauguration of a newly built house is a rather important event
in rural China. In the past, it was celebrated as shang liang: the
raising of the ridge pole. Where I did fieldwork in 2006–07 in
Zhongba village in the Enshi region of Hubei province,1 a lot of
construction activity and, hence, a lot of these celebrations were
taking place. The roofs of new houses are no longer built of lumber but
of bricks and concrete, so the celebration is no longer called “raising the
ridge pole” but “pouring the concrete” (E. dao ban’r2). But, just as in former
times, relatives, neighbors, and friends are invited for the event, where they
are supposed to eat a meal and give small gifts of cash to the homeowner.
The celebration for the pouring of the concrete roof of Pan Dejun’s new
house was set for early August 2006. Over time, I had become a regular visi-
tor at the Pan household, whichwas just a five-minutewalk from the village
administration building where I was living. Pan Dong, the family’s 14-year-
old son, had informed me well before the event that I should come to the
newhouse on day so and so for the inauguration. At the celebration, I rarely
saw his father, Pan Dejun, and when I did see him, he looked rather grim
and nervous. His arm was bandaged: He had broken it when he fell from
the scaffolding at the construction site. After dinner, the guests went to the
side rooms of the house to play mahjong, and I was dragged along as well
to sit down and play. We played until late in the night; only then did I real-
ize that the concrete for the roof would not be poured until midnight. Pan
Dejun had hired a contractor to do it, and he arrived with a team of ten
workers at 11 p.m. They prepared their machines and started to carry the
concrete in buckets on shoulder poles up onto the formwork for the second
floor. I found it incomprehensible that they would start this work under the
light of their headlamps atmidnight, themost inconvenient time one could
think of. When I asked Pan Dejun to explain, he told me that the workers
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had had another job during the day. But later, his son and
an uncle told me in passing that the time was chosen be-
cause the geomancer they had consulted had told them
they should do it at exactly this hour. It is still general prac-
tice in the village to have a geomancer determine the ex-
act hour for starting this work, to ensure astrological conso-
nance and future prosperity.
The accident in which Pan Dejun had broken his arm
was, in this context, extremely significant. Pan was wor-
ried that it could have been an ominous sign, and this had
made him evenmore anxious to take ritual precaution. The
day after the inauguration, Pan Dong told me that the ge-
omancer (fengshui xiansheng) and a Daoist priest (daoshi)
had performed several incantations and rituals in the new
house, of which Pan Dong did not understand much. He
just remembered that the Daoist priest had killed a rooster
and then sprayed its blood around thenewhouse. PanDong
understood that this was meant to protect the new house
against evil influences and ghosts. He added, “The people
here believe quite a lot of superstitions (mixin).”
Pan Dong is a very bright boy and had just started
higher middle school when I left Zhongba in 2007. In
December 2006, I had gone with him to the New Year
show staged by the middle school of Bashan township.
He had been given the main part in a comedy sketch, of
which he was very proud. The sketch that followed his was
about a sick oldman who believes that a healer–geomancer
(yinyang xiansheng) can cure his illness. Against the advice
of his children, who know that the healer is really a charla-
tan, the old man entrusts himself to the healer’s treatment.
In the end, the old man dies from the treatment. Performed
by teenagers, the whole piece was supposed to be comical,
and, in fact, the audience burst into laughter throughout
it. Its obvious intent was to mock the credulity of people
who hire healers and geomancers. One teacher explained
to me that the moral was to warn children and their par-
ents against the dangers of “feudal superstition” (fengjian
mixin), ofwhich such charlatans and geomancers are prime
representatives.
∗∗∗
This article is about what it means to live a local social-
ity if a good part of this sociality is continuously devalued
in official discourse. In it, I attempt to explain why someone
would admit that “people here believe in superstition” and
why such statements are often uttered as asides, stealthily,
sometimes with overtones of embarrassment, cynicism, or
irony.
The differences between official and vernacular, cen-
ter and periphery, and public and private are crucially im-
portant in any social space and, so, are not unique to con-
temporary rural China. I start with my impression that the
contradictions between official representation and vernac-
ular practice sometimes assume extreme proportions, as
exemplified in the story of Pan Dong. What one hears in the
news, what one is taught in school, and what is said in gov-
ernment announcements are generally quite different from,
and sometimes diametrically opposed to, what people say
and do at home. This is perhaps most apparent in connec-
tion with those things that fall in the category of “supersti-
tion,” such as the rituals of Daoist priests or the activities of
Chinese popular geomancy (fengshui). Similar ambiguities
characterize family celebrations such as funerals and wed-
dings and the relationships between officials and ordinary
people.
These ambiguities appear particularly salient when
people are confronted with an outsider who wants to in-
quire about just such things. Covertness, embarrassment,
cynicism, and irony are communicative strategies that
make it possible for them to acknowledge both sides of
the contradiction, to avoid confrontation, and to maintain
communication. They are ways of doing “face-work,” as de-
scribed by Erving Goffman (1955): actions that help one
avoid inconsistencies between the face one presents—the
positively attributed representation of a social person—and
what one actually does. Doing ethnography implies learn-
ing how to do face-work, that is, learning the conventional
ways of concealing and revealing such inconsistencies. In
my fieldwork, this meant, for instance, my learning how
to talk about such issues as geomancy, family celebrations,
and corruption. Countless awkward situations produced
by my foolish questions and clumsy behavior assisted this
learning process.
Yet the communicative strategies people employed to
deal with the ambiguities in outside representations of local
sociality point toward something beyond the awkwardness
of doing ethnography, something that I describe by refer-
ence to Michael Herzfeld’s concept of “cultural intimacy.”
Herzfeld defines “cultural intimacy” as “the recognition of
those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a
source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless
provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality”
(2005:3).
A “coded tension” exists between official representa-
tions, generally linked to nation and state, and vernac-
ular forms in face-to-face communities; this tension ex-
presses itself locally in embarrassment, cynicism, or irony.
Such are the reactions when “cultural intimacy” is exposed,
and they can both confirm the official representation and
satirize it. Inasmuch as these expressions are shared and
common, they bind people together in intimate spaces of
self-knowledge.
The distinction between official and vernacular does
not coincide with social or political inequality: The power-
ful as well as those without power have a sense of cultural
intimacy. Ethnographic and anecdotal accounts show how
sharedmetaphors of “the state” and “the people” are strate-
gically used by both bureaucrats and ordinary citizens.
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These “practical essentialisms” employed in social inter-
action exemplify what Herzfeld means by “social poetics,”
people’s creative deployment of allegedly stereotypical cul-
tural attributes to achieve specific effects.
With this concept, Herzfeld draws heavily on the
study of rhetoric and semiotics, and so one might wonder
whether the social poetics based on cultural intimacy are
not “merely” symbolic. At least one reviewer of Herzfeld’s
construct submits this predictable criticism: It focuses on
cultural and symbolic representation of state and nation,
but “is that enough? Are there no ‘objective-correlatives’? If
there are, how on earth do we find them?Where nation and
state coincide, the answermay be, ‘in the objective power of
the state’” (Cohen 1998:8). In other words, the gap between
official representations and local sociality that is character-
istic of cultural intimacy might be a consequence of pro-
cesses of state formation that increase the “objective power
of the state.”
Now, power is rather difficult to measure “objectively.”
Political scientists have attempted to do so by focusing
on the efficiency of state power and assessing “good” and
“bad” governance. In the case of the modern Chinese state,
various observers have phrased the problems of state power
and government efficiency in terms of “state involution”
(Duara 1987; Lu¨ 2000;Murphy 2007; Siu 1989a, 1989b;Wang
1991). These observers deal with different periods of state
making in modern Chinese history and reach slightly dif-
ferent conclusions. But they all share a basic line of argu-
ment: Efforts toward the formation of a modern state from
the republican era onward have not resulted in an efficient,
formal bureaucracy and a transparent state machine but,
rather, have reproduced and reinforced traditional modes
of operation and patrimonialism. Although, on the outside,
a shiny fac¸ade of formal rationality is constructed, inside a
personalistic cancer is growing. In all of these accounts, the
state or society is somewhere it actually should not be. To
argue in this vein necessitates a vantage point from which
one actually knows where each should be, and this vantage
point is usually a Eurocentric concept of the nation-state.
Most of these approaches are inspired by Clifford
Geertz’s (1963) description of “agricultural involution” in In-
donesia. The concept of “involution” has also been widely
used in the economic history of China (Elvin 1973; Huang
1990). In her outline of an alternative history of the “rice
economies” of East Asia, the historian Francesca Bray calls
for approaches that go beyond the “language of failure”
implicit in concepts such as “involution” or “growth with-
out development” (Elvin 1973). Both notions imply either
an attribution of essential Otherness or a negative ac-
count of Chinese history, measured in terms of what was
not achieved when compared with European history (Bray
1994:xiv). I take as a point of caution that concepts of “invo-
lution,” when applied to the state, might lead to the analyt-
ical pitfalls of Eurocentrism and orientalism.
In fact, the condemnation of traditionalist and person-
alistic ties is not only characteristic of state-involution ap-
proaches but it is also the most common public represen-
tation of corruption in the People’s Republic. Toward the
end of this article, I argue that the ways in which this invo-
lutionary cancer is officially denigrated and locally recog-
nized are just as productive of shared commonality as are
practices related to “superstition” and fengshui. Those who
share a sense of the same intimacies form what might be
aptly called a “community of complicity.”
These communities of complicity cut across the
boundaries of state and society. The involution approaches
all emphasize that state and society are deeply entangled; I
go one step further and envision an intimate state, one that
is “a constitutive force at the heart of the social world,” in
Eric Mueggler’s words (2001:5). Instead of correlating this
sense of intimacy with the “objective power of the state,”
I try to relate it to a history of state formation in everyday
lives. My examples are stories told about fengshui, about a
Confucian discourse of “manners and etiquette” (li) at a fu-
neral, and about putatively corrupt local officials.
Fengshui
Fengshui is the traditional Chinese practice of geomancy,
a popular cosmology that connects astrological signs and
cosmological elements with the shape of the lived land-
scape. Interpreting the particular fengshui of a place aims
to take advantage of and to adjust its positive “energy.”Most
laypeople hire an expert geomancer (fengshui xiansheng or
yinyang xiansheng) for this work. Although the practice has
long been suppressed by Chinese governments as “feudal
superstition” (fengjian mixin), it has remained immensely
popular, especially in the countryside. In Zhongba, as of
2007, almost everyone who prepared to build a new house
or a tomb consulted a geomancer, who helped to situate the
house or grave according to the fengshui of its site.
Fengshui is closely linked to the fate (mingyun) of a
family and a household, but sometimes it is extended and
linked to a lineage, a hamlet, or even an entire township.
One of the main aims in Chinese geomancy and divination
is to influence and manipulate, to some extent, the cosmo-
logical forces at work in people’s lives. The knowledge of
fengshui can, thus, be instrumentalized by the powerful to
impinge on the aspirations of others. In what follows, I re-
count three stories about powerful representatives of the
state who used fengshui. These stories take place right at
the interface of official and vernacular discourses and ex-
emplify the ambiguities of the state and its representatives
in local society.
The first story is about the fengshui of a small val-
ley that opens into the northwestern side of the triangular
Bashan plain. Over the centuries, the stream in this valley
has formed a deep meandering channel between rugged
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hills and rocks. Where one enters the valley, coming from
the plain, one passes the Chicken Branch hill on the left
side. People say that, long ago, this hill was much higher,
that it had rocks on top, and that it provided the valley be-
low it with very good fengshui. TheGong family lived in sev-
eral hamlets in the valley and was said to prosper because
of its good fengshui. Talent and ability (rencai) abounded
in the valley, the sons of the Gong family became high of-
ficials, and the Gong family altogether was very wealthy. At
the time of the Qianlong emperor, the prosperity and suc-
cess of the family aroused the envy of a mandarin in the
capital of the prefecture, Shinan (nowEnshi). Hence, he had
his henchmen demolish the rocks on top of Chicken Branch
and dig a hole (quekou) into the summit of the hill. There-
after, no member of the Gong family succeeded in the im-
perial exams, and the family declined.
The story of theGong familymight have been told in al-
most the same way in imperial China. In fact, many stories
of this kind have been documented in southeastern China
and Taiwan. They generally speak of the ambiguous rela-
tionship between center and periphery, as an outside power
destroys the cosmological order of a locality. Yet, at the same
time, local levels of “civilization” and ancestral wealth are
presented in terms of the center, that is, success in the im-
perial examinations.
Like other stories about the distant past, the story of the
Gong family was told to me with a certain folkloristic fla-
vor: It did not really matter how truthful this story was, and
I could not sense that it hadmuch connection with the cur-
rent state of the Gong family. Because such stories were sit-
uated in the distant past, no one found them embarrassing
in any sense.
The style and tone of narration change verymuchwhen
a story comes closer to the concerns of the present. An ap-
parently true story about the same valley is somewhat simi-
lar to the legend of the Gong family. In the past, after strong
rainfalls, the stream in this valley often flooded the fields
that bordered it. During one campaign of the Cultural Revo-
lution,3 the cadres of two production brigades had the idea
of opening several tunnels into the area’s rock formations,
so that the stream would flow in a straight line and the
fields would remain dry. With the help of dynamite deto-
nations, three long tunnels were opened through the rocks,
and the river left its old bed and flowed through them. Lo-
cals initially opposed the tunnel project, arguing that it was
not worth the effort. But the most serious disadvantage, in
their view, was that it would destroy the fengshui of the val-
ley.4 Yet no one ever directly admitted this to me. During
the spring festival period in 2006, I accompanied a family
from Zhongba on a visit to relatives in the Gong family. We
spent all afternoon in conversation, and oneman related in
much detail the story of the three tunnels. Everyone agreed
that their excavation had been awaste ofmanpower and re-
sources, but no one spoke about the negative influence the
project might have had on the fengshui of the valley. Only
one elderly uncle quietly mentioned that “in the past they
said that it might have destroyed the fengshui.” I asked fur-
ther and got the answer that “back in those days, they ob-
viously could not have said that.” Later on, the friend I was
with confirmed tome thatmany old people in the valley are
convinced that their bad luck comes from the bad fengshui
of the valley. A minor official in his thirties, he talked about
these beliefs in a rather disapproving way, half condemning
such “superstition,” half mocking it.
The ambiguities of fengshui have a long history. In fact,
local governments in imperial times were often suspicious
of popular cosmologies, potential heterodoxies, and here-
sies (Bruun 2003:ch. 2). Yet the imperial state almost never
went so far as to directly intervene in local practices; in-
stead, it favored gentle guidance by “correction” and “exem-
plar” (Hamilton 1989). Since the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, practices like fengshui have been broadly devalued by
educated elites, but they have remained common among
ordinary people. In the Maoist era, local “superstition” was
fervently denounced and systematically attacked.
The legend about the malicious mandarin who de-
stroyed the fengshui of the Gong family hamlets exempli-
fies the common assumption that the powerful andwealthy
tried to manipulate fengshui and the belief that they ac-
tually must have done so rather successfully—“if not, how
could they have become powerful and wealthy in the first
place?” This kind of circular argument sometimes assumed
ironic or even grotesque proportions: Repeatedly, older
peasants toldme that the power and success ofMao Zedong
and other leaders was really due to their intimate knowl-
edge and versatile manipulation of fengshui. One famous
story relates that during the civil war between Nationalists
and Communists, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Na-
tionalist Party, tried to find the tomb ofMao Zedong’s father
so that he could dig out the remains and demolish the tomb.
In this way, he could destroy the fengshui of the Mao family
and ensure the future misfortune of Mao Zedong in partic-
ular. But when the neighbors of theMao family heard about
the plan, they removed the name badges from the tombs
in the village so that Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers could not
find the tomb. In anger, the soldiers wildly destroyed several
tombs in the village, a most outrageous and horrible action,
as devastating a family tomb equals destroying the integrity
and prosperity of a family line altogether. The fengshui sur-
rounding the tombs of the Mao family, however, was pre-
served and continued to provide excellent fortune for the
family. By contrast, the infamy of digging out the graves of
innocent families led tomisfortune for, and the eventual de-
feat of, Chiang and the Nationalists.
In recent years, fengshui has become a respected ob-
ject of study for architects, historians, and even design-
ers in mainland China. Many books and experts have tried
to prove that fengshui is really “scientific” (kexue) and,
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therefore, does not contradict the scientistic worldview pro-
mulgated by party and state. Yet, in the countryside, peo-
ple never publicly make references to fengshui and related
practices like astrology and divination. They speak about
them only in private and almost always with a somewhat
ironic undertone. In the Maoist era, exposing the fengshui
practices of others would have amounted to serious de-
nouncement, and many people still relate to them in secre-
tive, partly embarrassed, ways.
Another practice that was severely controlled and
partly forbidden under Maoism was staging huge banquets
for family celebrations, in particular, weddings and funer-
als. These events are closely linked to geomantic practices.
At a wedding, the bowing of a couple in front of the ances-
tral tablets in themain roomof the bridegroom’s house con-
firmed and reenacted the central axis of the house, which,
ideally, was adjusted to the fengshui of its surroundings. At
a funeral, the coffin was placed along this central axis, and
the tombwas also located according to fengshui. Everything
people did on these ritual occasions, from eating at the ban-
quet tables to offering presents of goods and cash to the
hosts, was supposed to conform to the rules of propriety
and etiquette, which Confucian texts call “li.” The propriety
of li, however, is nowadays sometimes just as embarrassing
as fengshui.
The embarrassment of li
One of the first terms that I learned in the local dialect
was chijiu, pronounced “qi jiu,” which literally means “to
eat wine,” that is, to attend a banquet. More specifically, it
means to attend another’s family celebration, like a wed-
ding, a funeral, a housewarming party, the birth of a child,
a birthday, or a celebration for passing the entry examina-
tions to the university or the army.Of these, themost impor-
tant life-cycle events are weddings and funerals, called “red
and white celebrations” (hongbai xishi), according to the
symbolic colors for happiness (red) and mourning (white).
Such celebrations are held at the house of the host family
or, for families in the market town of Bashan or in the city
of Enshi, in a restaurant. Attending a banquet implies not
only sharing an abundant meal but also offering the host a
present, which nowadays is usually cash. The family that is
“hosting the wine” (E. zhengjiu) has to prepare well in ad-
vance. Generally, the day of the celebration is chosen with
the help of a diviner, who calculates the most propitious
date and hour, according to the “eight characters” (ba zi) of
the year, month, day, and hour of the births of themain par-
ticipants. Before the celebration, the host invites neighbors
and friends to “help” (bang mang) in hosting the event.
All these actions necessitate proper behavior and for-
mality. The established rules (guiju) and etiquette (liyi or
lijie) at such occasions are particular forms of li, or ritual.
Similar to the difficulty of defining ritual, li eludes easy
definition. In contemporary Chinese, li can mean many
things. It is part of the expressions for politeness (limao),
etiquette and custom (liyi, lijie, or lisu), worship (libai), and
gift (liwu). In the popular expression “courtesy demands
reciprocity” (lishang wanglai), li means also the propriety
inherent in reciprocal relationships. Just like the practices
of fengshui, the expressions of li are characterized by ambi-
guities. Here I give an example related to the funeral of the
father of a high official.
Sun Jundong was one of themost successful officials in
Bashan township. After three years as the party secretary of
the township, he was elevated to vice party secretary in a
neighboring county, the next higher rank in the hierarchy of
party and government. In the spring of 2007, I had the op-
portunity to attend the funeral of his father. Two neighbors
in Zhongba toldme that theywould play the shawm (suona)
and drums in a funeral band and asked me if I wanted to
join them.
The home of the Sun family is in one of the most re-
mote villages of Bashan township, about two-hours drive by
car into the mountains from the market of Bashan. On the
dirt road, we saw numerous sport utility vehicles and the
black Audis and Volkswagens that are used by government
officials and businessmen. We attended the last night of the
funeral, and from the moment we arrived at 5 p.m. until
late in the evening, the popping noise of firecrackers did not
cease for a singlemoment. According to local custom, about
three-dozen neighbors and relatives help prepare the food
and host the guests at a funeral. At this funeral, however,
there were about one hundred helpers, who all had their
names listed on a beautiful painted poster on onewall of the
house. On another wall, a programwas posted detailing the
performances and rituals for the evening, all written in fine
calligraphy. According to local tradition, the coffin is laid out
in the central room of the house, which is called the “hall
of filial piety” (xiaotang) during the funerary period. The
hall in this case was richly ornamented with carved bam-
boo sticks and colored paper, various paintings, and sev-
eral huge tablets that described the life of the deceased in
poems. All this was the work of teacher Lei, a well-known
“man of culture” (wenren) and former head of the “office for
culture” in a neighboring township. He also led the perfor-
mances and rituals in the evening, which included speeches
in classical Chinese; amourning ceremony, duringwhich 24
music bandsmarched and played; songs and couplets sung
to all close relatives and important guests; mourning songs
for the deceased and his family; mourning dances around
the coffin; and lion dances.
This was by far the biggest and most lavish funeral that
I had seen during my time in Bashan. It was also a huge
show of power and money. Normally at a Chinese funeral,
the guests give presents and money to the host, and these
gifts are listed in a red book. People always stress the impor-
tance of reciprocity in these exchanges: When donors host
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their own future family celebrations, they expect to receive
equivalent amounts from those to whom they have previ-
ously given. At the funeral of Sun Jundong’s father, around
70 thousand yuan was given,5 according to the red book.
That amount is immense compared with the conventional
sums that ordinary farmers deal with: Ten thousand yuan is
an above-average annual income for a family in the region,
and it is also the average sum of money received at a wed-
ding or a funeral.
Such celebrations were the targets of Maoist policies
against “feudal superstition” throughout the revolutionary
era, and their suppression has only slowly loosened since
the 1980s. Since then, there have been huge increases in
the sums of money and presents given at funerals and
weddings. Intermittently, the governmentwages campaigns
against the “waste” of the practice of giving monetary
presents. In the spring of 2007, for instance, the city gov-
ernment of Enshi engaged in an intensive campaign to curb
the “waste” of money and the “immorality” of such “back-
ward” customs. Local television programs disparaged ex-
cessive gift giving, and all party members had to partici-
pate in education sessions about the “backwardness” of this
practice.
My attendance at the Sun family funeral surely pro-
duced some uncertainties and awkwardness. On the one
hand, I was a foreign guest, and everyone in the local gov-
ernment and most ordinary people in the surrounding vil-
lages knew about my presence in the area and that I walked
around the villages, observing, talking to, and asking odd
questions of local residents. On the other hand, I was not
invited to this celebration, and at some points during the
evening it was not clear to me whether I was welcome. My
neighbors whowere playingmusic had said that I should go
and pay my respects to the former secretary of Bashan. But
Sun Jundong himself did not say a single word to me dur-
ing the night, even after I had given a short funeral oration
at the invitation of the ceremonial coordinator. Some rela-
tives of the Sun family, businessmen in Enshi and Wuhan,
were extremely friendly to me and told me I should film the
event. A cameraman among the helpers was already filming
it. When I asked him if it would be possible for me to get a
copy of his film, he said that, unfortunately, it was reserved
for the members of the Sun family.
Clearly, Sun Jundong faced several dilemmas here. On
the one hand, he had to present himself as the impeccable
leader, representative of the highmorals of the party and the
government. In this case, he had to present this image not
only to locals but also to a foreigner. On the other hand, he
was expected to live up to the demands of filial piety (xiao),
and he and his family were expected to engage in what was
considered proper (li) and virtuous (daode) behavior after
the death of his father. He obviously tried to do both and
to represent his family in both respects. In addition, the fu-
neral gave him the opportunity to receive huge amounts of
money from officials trying to establish relationships of pa-
tronage with him. After all, he was the highest official in the
township and is now a powerful cadre at the county level—
a most important man for all in the lower government
offices to know. Last, but not least, the funeral was the occa-
sion for many officials, friends, relatives, and business part-
ners to reciprocate for the gifts that he had given them in
the past.
When the funeral went through Bashan’s gossip mills,
the accusation that, by holding such a massive funeral, Sun
Jundongwas really engaging in “feudal” and “corrupt” prac-
tices frequently came up. A week after the funeral, the topic
was mentioned among the officials of Zhongba village, and
Tan Tao, the then party secretary of the village, asked me
in front of some other officials if I had gone to the funeral.
Later, when we were having a cigarette together, Tan Tao
asked again, “Howwas it at the funeral? Don’t you think that
it was really luxurious and decadent (haochi)?” Not waiting
for my answer, he switched into dialect and said to the vil-
lage accountant that “people of Sun’s rank should not en-
gage in these kind of activities.”My impressionwas that Tan
Tao could not hide some Schadenfreude about Sun having
exposed himself to my prying presence.
A couple of days later, I met teacher Song and had
a long conversation with him about the funeral. Teacher
Song is retired and works now as the janitor of the pri-
mary school. Most of the day he sits in a little lodge next to
the gate of the school and reads classical novels or books
about the heroes of the revolution. This afternoon, I told
him about my impressions of the funeral and also about
my insecurity regarding the reaction of the Sun family to
my presence. He said that everyone in Bashan knew that the
Sun funeral was surely the biggest one that Bashan had seen
in its history—“since the beginning of the world” [pangu
kai tian yilai], he said, smiling. He was not referring to
the pomp that I had seen, the banquet and the musicians,
which I thoughtwas themeasurement. He knewof other fu-
nerals at which about forty bands of musicians had played,
compared with only 24 at Sun Jundong’s house. The bands
are only sent by the daughters and sons-in-law of the de-
ceased’s family and, hence, show how many affines some-
one has. What people in Bashan were really talking about
these days, teacher Song said, was the amount of money
given. Most of the secretaries and higher-level officials in
Bashan had given presents; and most of them surely had
not appeared at the funeral itself, but only those closest to
the family, teacher Song estimated. Accordingly,muchmore
money must have been given than the roughly 70 thousand
yuan recorded in the red book of presents. Song said that, in
the past, “the thunder was big and the rain was little,” but
now “the thunder is little, and the rain is big” [lei xiang xiao,
yu lai da], meaning that now there is less noise and pomp
but more of the rain of money. Song confirmed that Sun
Jundong would have been worried about my coming and
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watching all that money flow, fearing that I could report it.
And then he told me about several cases of officials in simi-
lar situations who had been convicted of corruption.
The funeral of Sun Jundong’s father illustrates that cul-
tural intimacy is something quite different from the cultural
resistance of the subaltern. The one who was embarrassed
in this case was one of themost powerful local leaders. Both
local villagers and government officials shared a common
discourse about propriety and a common understanding
that one’s representation to outsiders and the local practice
of holding family celebrations stand in a tense relationship.
What is crucial is how the contradictions are negotiated. In
their demeanor and speech at the funeral, Sun Jundong and
his guests enacted local ideals of proper behavior: in this
case, the ritual of a funeral, which is one of the most impor-
tant services children provide to their parents, expressing
their filial piety (xiao). Hosts and guests are supposed to be-
have according to rules and etiquette that can be summa-
rized under the header of Confucian “propriety” (li). But in
the privacy of everyday talk, both villagers and fellow cadres
would point out how corrupt this behavior is.
In the conclusion to her book Gifts, Favors, and Ban-
quets, Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (1994:317–320) tells a very
similar story of a rural cadre named Zhao. After the huge fu-
nerary celebration for Zhao’s father, a rival official accuses
Zhao of “corrupt and feudal” activities. Zhao is arrested
and subjected to party discipline. But the locals all support
him and plead his case in front of higher government
officials. For Yang, this is an example of ritual being “a
self-organizing Vehicle of the Minjian” (1994:317). In her
interpretation, the minjian, or the popular realm of renqing
(human feeling) ethics and guanxi (relationship) produc-
tion, is an emerging independent social realm opposed to
the anonymous exertion of state power. Let me quote at
length from her interpretation of the events following the
funeral of Zhao’s father:
From the people’s point of view, the funeral was not a
“backward” or “feudal” institution, nor was Zhao using
his position to extort money and gifts from them, but
it provided an important social occasion for repaying
debts owed or initiated a new round of debt relation-
ship with Zhao and his family. The local people sought
to transform their relationship with Cadre Zhao from
an impersonal, administrative, ruler-to-governed top-
down relationship into a personal renqing relationship
of giving and repaying. It is noteworthy that, counter
to the official policy of de-emphasizing and sometimes
banning rituals, the local people attach much social
significance to funerary rituals and feasts. The ritual
provides a staging ground for the practice of renqing
with an official, . . . so that there is a clear association
between ritual or feast and renqing, and between rit-
ual, renqing, and good government.
Zhao himself is a cadre whose attitude toward his job
is tinged with a heavy renqing perspective and who al-
lows himself to enter into debt relationships with the
people. That is why when he got in trouble with his su-
periors, so many people organized themselves to sup-
port him. In this action the people were not just de-
fending Zhao’s personal integrity, but also a certain
approach to government and the importance of ritual
in their social life. In rural Wenzhou, minjian forces
have begun to organize themselves and even to prevail
against the state, and these forces include the discourse
and practice of renqing and ritual. [Yang 1994:319–320]
Note how Yang makes use of the category of “the
people” to denote a unified body who fight for a “certain
approach to government and the importance of ritual in
social life.” This approach is characterized by personalized
relationships of renqing and guanxi, and it is diametrically
opposed to the impersonal administrative relationships of
the state. In my example, the people did not have such a
uniform judgment of the high official who staged a huge
funeral. Both the popular realm (which Yang calls by its
Chinese name, “minjian”) and the state discourse are much
more fragmented. Both ordinary people and government
officials use elements of vernacular and state discourses.
I also subscribe to a binary opposition, but it is not that
between “the local people” and “the state” but that be-
tween an official, outside representation and a vernacular,
inside practice. At the funeral of Sun Jundong, local villagers
and officials were partaking in both discourses: Some locals
were admiring the pompof the funeral, whereas otherswere
criticizing it and denouncing the corruption of local offi-
cials. Similarly, officials were divided on the ways in which
the funeral should be interpreted; whereas many had to of-
fer monetary presents, some were also quite cynical about
Sun, especially when talking in private.
Most of the practices identified as “Confucian propri-
ety” (li) had been thoroughly condemned during theMaoist
era. The “Confucian doctrine” (lijiao) was an instrument of
landlords and capitalists to oppress the peasants. Hence, all
of these practices were tightly controlled until the 1980s.
Although political control is much looser now, a consider-
able propaganda effort still attempts to curb such “waste”
(puzhang langfei) linked to “backward” (luohou) practices.
The condemnation of thiswaste ties inwell with heightened
concerns about cadre corruption.
Communities of complicity
The era of “reform and opening” that started in the 1980s
has been characterized by growing concerns about corrup-
tion. The corruption of local officials was a favorite topic
of villagers in their conversations with me, second only to
the weather. Taxes and fees levied on private enterprises,
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several government enterprises, and, recently, land expro-
priations close to the township where a “development dis-
trict” (kaifa qu) is being built provide high revenue for the
local government. Locals frequently alleged that the re-
sponsible officials have pocketed part of this revenue.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the general agricultural tax
and the countless fees collected from farmers had led to
many conflicts and, in some regions, to collective protests
(Lu¨ 1997; Perry 1999). In recent years, these taxes and fees
have been widely reduced, and in 2003 the general agricul-
tural tax was completely abolished. National policies have
turned now toward paying subsidies to farmers. In Bashan,
one particular support payment is given to tea farmers
via the “turn farmland into forest” (tuigeng huanlin) pro-
gram. Tea plantations conveniently count as “productive
forest,” so farmers who have dried out their paddy fields
and planted tea shrubs receive a subsidy for a certain pe-
riod. That is but one minor part of all the support pay-
ments that local governments in recognized “poor districts”
(pinkun diqu) receive from the provincial and national lev-
els. All this is well known among local farmers, and themost
common local commentary about it is that the govern-
ment hierarchy, from the central government downward,
works like a funnel with several sieves. At every level, offi-
cials enrich themselves from the lump sums that the cen-
tral government is investing, and, therefore, almost nothing
reaches the farmers.
Connected to this way of seeing the governmental hier-
archy is the idea that the higher up one looks on the gov-
ernmental ladder, the better the officials are. Frequently,
local villagers pointed out to me that the central govern-
ment, represented by ChairmanHu Jintao and PremierWen
Jiabao, does actually care about the peasants and promotes
good policies. Yet further down the government ladder, of-
ficials get increasingly worse. In many people’s view, the
worst ones are the cadres of the township level—the offi-
cials that are in closest everyday contact with ordinary peo-
ple. Everyday interactions with township officials are tied to
economic and social interests, whereas the relationship of
farmers with the central state is more symbolic and moral
and is mediated at various levels. Guo Xiaolin (2001:436ff.)
has described this as a “bifurcated state,” in which people
keep placing hope and confidence in the central govern-
ment, even when local government becomes increasingly
predatory.
Even though people often complain about local offi-
cials and have very pointed opinions about them, they need
to approach them about identification cards, marriage cer-
tificates, permits to build houses, family planning issues,
land conflicts, and so on. When complicated issues are at
stake, locals prefer a personal relationship and contact with
an official. My neighbor Liu Dawei, for instance, often lec-
tured me on the “art of relationship making” (guanxi xue).
When he was planning to build a new house in the sum-
mer of 2007, the village officials initially opposed his plan.
He then invited the vice secretary of the township govern-
ment for several meals at the best restaurant in Bashan and
offered him several boxes of expensive cigarettes. Liu Dawei
also pointed out to me that he had chosen to cultivate a re-
lationship with this secretary because he shares the same
surname with him, even though he is not a direct relative.
The village government eventually granted Liu Dawei per-
mission to build his new house.
Contrary to such personal ties with officials, govern-
ment propaganda continuously emphasizes impartiality
and formal equality. Concomitantly, party education pro-
grams focus on raising the “quality” (suzhi) of cadres and
their behavior (Murphy 2007). At the same time, locals
like Liu Dawei, or the neighbors and officials offering cash
to Sun Jundong, are clearly aware that it is important to
have a personal bond with officials, in which human feel-
ing (renqing) is properly expressed through gifts. From the
perspective of some academic observers, such phenom-
ena are aspects of “state involution” in contemporary China
(Lu¨ 2000; Siu 1989a 1989b; Wang 1991). Lu¨ Xiaobo, for in-
stance, points out an “organizational involution” within the
Chinese party state. He defines this involution as
a process whereby a revolutionary party, while adopt-
ing and expanding many “modern” (i.e., rational, for-
mal, impersonal) structures, . . . fails to adapt itself to,
and be transformed by, the routinization and bureau-
cratization that characterize modern bureaucracy; at
the same time, it is unable to maintain its original dis-
tinctive competence and identity. Its members make
adjustments and adaptations neither through revolu-
tionary ideologies nor modern institutions and prac-
tices, but through reinforced and elaborated traditional
modes of operation. [2000:22]
Lu¨ adds that such “neotraditionalism” produces “disil-
lusioned, status-conscious, and undisciplined cadres, who
in themanner of pre-revolutionary . . . local officials, put the
interests of more intimate secondary and primary groups
above those of the regime” (2000:23). Rachel Murphy has
recently used Lu¨’s framework to analyze how party edu-
cation campaigns work to maintain this “organizational
involution”: The campaigns deflect systemic critique and,
instead, blame the problems of corruption on the ethical
misbehavior of individuals. She concludes that the “ritu-
alization” of the education campaigns reproduces the top-
down party hierarchy and the personalistic networks within
this hierarchy (Murphy 2007).
It is not only academic observers who see person-
alistic networks and informal dealings fulfilling systemic
functions in a supposedly impersonal bureaucracy. Both
villagers and cadres are well aware that one’s personal rela-
tionswith officials are themost important and reliable ones.
But they do not pronounce that in public. People share a
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knowledge of the “involutionary cancer” of personalistic
and informal relations; if cadres admit that these relations
exist, they do so rather ruefully. The embarrassed or ironic
ways in which they make such admissions indicate shared
understandings of local mechanisms of power. Such local
knowledge (e.g., of li) is transfigured into stereotypes and
essentialisms both by ordinary people and by academics.
Yet social actors make strategic use of these essentialisms
and sometimes reject them forthrightly.
What emerges behind this symbolic struggle is an
intimate space of common knowledge, or a “commu-
nity of complicity.” Belonging to such a community de-
pends on the skill with which a social actor can make
use of practical essentialisms. Only the most unskilled ac-
tor straightforwardly and earnestly admits that “we believe
in superstition.” The moral, capable social actor, however,
uses gestures of embarrassment, of irony, and of cynicism
to prove his or her belonging to those who know.
I do not mean the notion of “communities of com-
plicity” to imply that the object of this intimate knowledge
and complicity is a true neotraditionalism, more “true”
than the official representation of a rationalized political
system and a modern citizenry. Indeed, the logical conse-
quence of the involution argument is that the modern and
rational is only a false mask, barely concealing the neo-
traditionalist “truth.” In my argument, both the modernist
representation and traditionalist self-knowledge are true.
Communities of complicity are formed by those who share
an intimate knowledge of the boundaries—the faces—of
modernism and traditionalism.
Conclusion
I started with the apparent contradiction between official
representation and vernacular practice in the case of Pan
Dong, whose father invited a geomancer for the inaugura-
tion of the family’s new house and who laughed together
with his classmates about a healer–geomancer at the school
show. This tension between the official and the vernacular
leads to a rueful recognition of local sociality that I call, with
Herzfeld, “cultural intimacy.” The stories told about feng-
shui illustrate a certain ambiguity between peripheral local-
ity and center characteristic of both late-imperial and con-
temporary China. But the sense of cultural intimacy linked
to fengshui and other superstitions was hugely intensified
by the state formation processes of the 20th century, in par-
ticular during the Maoist era. In the embarrassment of li,
or ritual, are the remnants of a Maoist discourse that vi-
olently denigrated Confucianism. Cultural intimacy is not
something limited to the little people or the subaltern—
it is also felt by officials, like the county secretary, Sun
Jundong. Just like ordinary villagers, the powerful also en-
gage in social poetics, that is, in the practical and strategic
use of essentialisms. My examples have shown how peo-
ple used essentialisms of fengshui, of li, and of corruption.
I have pointed out that, in fact, a knowledge of and fa-
miliarity with practices that others might call “corruption”
or “involution” is common among officials and villagers
and that this shared knowledge defines communities of
complicity.
The valuation and control of much everyday action
is now characterized by a tension between powerful out-
side representations, promulgated in schools and govern-
ment offices and by modern media (in particular, newspa-
pers and the Internet but also the “Maoist modern” of wall
posters, scrolls, and loudspeaker announcements) and an
intimate space of local sociality that more or less contra-
dicts what is written and announced in those representa-
tions. Because of this tension, local socialities are felt to be
“intimate” spaces. If the lived contradictions are pointed
out, or made visible, a local’s first reaction can be an awk-
ward smile. With a fellow insider, it is just as possible to be-
come ironic: The existence of such lived contradictions is
actually quite clear tomost participants and to the initiated.
However, embarrassment, irony, and “un-plain” speech and
expression are not understood by everyone and so repro-
duce the boundaries of an intimate space. Yet, sometimes,
awkwardness and irony can turn into utter frustration. This
occurs when the tension between outward representation
and intimate practice becomes unbearable. What, more
than anything else, characterizes the attitudes and posi-
tions toward practices like geomancy, ritual, and corrup-
tion is a discursive uncertainty. And this is perhaps the
biggest difference from earlier times: I imagine that, up
to the 1930s, it was close to impossible in the villages of
Bashan for someone to crack a joke about fengshui or about
the principle of li. Now these topics have to be treated
with irony.
My interpretation of spaces of intimacy produced by
the relationship between local sociality and the state is also
based on many embarrassing experiences I had in China.
Just like any outsider trying to adapt to an unfamiliar so-
cial environment, I often felt that I had to be careful and
cautious to avoid awkwardness arising out of a conflict
of perceptions. The moments of potential embarrassment
and felt intimacy were acute—at least in my experience—
when I broached issues related to so-called superstition,
participation in family celebrations, and dealing with lo-
cal cadres, not to mention the topics of human rights,
democracy, and corruption. In all these instances, I very
much felt the necessity to be sensitive and cautious in my
actions.
Of course, the arrival of a foreigner often leads to situ-
ations of awkwardness, embarrassment, and irony. Ethnog-
raphy is, after all, an intrusion into the intimate spaces of
others, and not only of individuals but also of nation-states.
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Yet I believe that such anxieties were not merely relevant
to my own interactions with people in Zhongba. Villagers
who consult diviners and geomancers but laugh at their
portrayal in comedy sketches; leaderswho are torn between
local notions of propriety and a modernist state discourse;
and lower-level officials who extol impartiality and formal
rules but recognize the importance of personal relation-
ships, which political scientists describe as “involutionary
cancer”—for all these people, the boundaries between state
and society are made by exposing and hiding spaces of cul-
tural intimacy; and this everyday practice reproduces both
local sociality and the state itself. It creates communities
of complicity, communities of those who share an aware-
ness of intimate spaces that are marked by embarrassment,
irony, and cynicism at their boundaries.
Notes
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1. All names of persons and of places below the prefectural level
are pseudonyms.
2. Throughout the text, I italicize Chinese words in the stan-
dard pinyin form. Words in the Enshi dialect that differ markedly
in pronunciation and meaning from standard Mandarin Chinese
are marked with an E. All other Chinese words in italics are part of
the vocabulary of standard Mandarin.
3. People in Bashan remembered it as part of the national “Learn
fromDazhai in agriculture” (nongye xue dazhai) campaign. In 1963,
Mao Zedong issued this slogan to encourage all rural communes in
the People’s Republic to emulate the achievements of the Dazhai
commune in Shanxi province, in particular, in land reclamation
through hard manual work. On this campaign and agrarian radi-
calism during the 1960s and 1970s, see Zweig 1989.
4. According to fengshui beliefs, a stream is a dragon (long), and,
in general, a meandering stream is more auspicious than a straight
one.
5. The exchange rate in 2006–07 was approximately eight yuan
to $1, so this would have been an equivalent of $8,750.
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